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Howard Kunreuther

Reducing Losses from
Catastrophic Risks through
Long-Term Insurance and
Mitigation
RECENT CHANGES IN THE IMPACTS OF EXTREME EVENTS
Increases in Economic and Insured Losses

The economic and insured losses from natural disasters have

increased significantly in recent years, as shown in figure 1 (each verti-

cal bar represents the total economic losses, the darker zone represents the insured portion of it)/ A comparison of these economic losses

over time reveals a huge increase: $53.6 billion (1950-59), $93.3 billion
(1960-69), $161.7 billion (1970-79), $262.9 billion (1980-89), and $778.3
billion (1990-99). The current decade has already seen $420.6 billion in
losses, principally due to the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, which
produced historic records.

Catastrophes have had a more devastating impact on insurers
over the past 15 years than in the entire history of insurance. Between
1970 and the mid-1980s, annual insured losses from natural disasters

(including forest fires) were in the $3 billion to $4 billion range. The
insured losses from Hurricane Hugo that made landfall in Charleston,

South Carolina on September 22, 1989 exceeded $4 billion (in 1989
prices). It was the first natural disaster to inflict more than $1 billion
of insured losses in the United States. There was a radical increase

in insured losses in the early 1990s with Hurricane Andrew (1992) in

social research Vol 75 : No 3 : Fall 2008 905
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Figure 1. Evolution of "Great Natural Catastrophes" Worldwide,
1950-2007: Economic Versus Insured Impact
Great natural disasters 1950 ± 2007
Overall and insured losses

Sources: Data from Munich Re; 2008 Geo Risks Research. In billions of US dollars, indexed to 2007.

Florida ($23.7 billion in 2007 dollars) and the Northridge earthquake
(1994) in California ($19.6 billion in 2007 dollars). The four hurricanes
in Florida in 2004 (Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne) taken together
cost insurers almost $33 billion. Insured and reinsured losses from

Hurricane Katrina, which made landfall in the United States in August

2005, are now estimated at $46 billion; total losses paid by private
insurers due to major natural catastrophes were $87 billion in 2005.
Figure 2 depicts the upward trend in worldwide insured losses from
catastrophes between 1970 and 2007 (in 2007 indexed prices; corrected
for inflation).

Table 1 reveals the 20 most costly catastrophes for the insurance

sector since 1970 (in 2007 dollars). Several observations are relevant
here. First, 18 of the 20 most costly events have occurred since 1990.
Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake were the first two

906 social research
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Figure 2. Worldwide Evolution of Catastrophe Insured Losses,
1970-2007

Note: For 9/11, all lines, including property and business interruption (BI). All figures are in billions
of US dollars, indexed to 2007.
Source: Wharton Risk Center, with data from Swiss Re and Insurance Information Institute.

disasters that the industry experienced where losses were greater than
$10 billion (designated as "super-cats") and caused insurers to reflect
on whether risks from natural disasters were insurable. To assist

them in making this determination, many firms began using catas-

trophe models to estimate the likelihood and consequences to their
insured portfolios from specific disasters in hazard-prone areas (Grossi
and Kunreuther, 2005). With the exception of the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, all of the events in the top 20 were natural disasters. More than 80 percent of these were weather-related events: hurri-

canes and typhoons, storms, and floods, with nearly three-quarters of
the claims in the United States.

Losses due to natural catastrophes and man-made disasters were
far below the long-term trend in 2006. Of the $48 billion in catastro-

Reducing Losses from Catastrophic Risks 907
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Table 1. The 20 Most Costly Insured Catastrophes in the World,
1970-20071
Victims

(Dead or Area of Primary
Cost* Event Missing) Year Damage
$46.3 Hurricane Katrina 1,836 2005 USA, Gulf of Mexico

35.5 9/11 Attacks 3,025 2001 USA
23.7 Hurricane Andrew 43 1992 USA, Bahamas

Northridge
19.6 Earthquake 61 1994 USA
14.1 Hurricane Ivan 124 2004 USA, Caribbean

13.3 Hurricane Wilma 35 2005 USA, Gulf of Mexico
10.7 Hurricane Rita 34 2005 USA, Gulf of Mexico

8.8 Hurricane Charley 24 2004 USA, Caribbean
8.6 Typhoon Mireille 51 1991 Japan

7.6 Hurricane Hugo 71 1989 Puerto Rico, USA
7.4 Winterstorm Daria 95 1990 France, UK

7.2 Winterstorm Lothar 110 1999 France, Switzerland

6.1 Winterstorm Kyrill 54 2007 Germany, UK, NL, France
5.7 Storms and Floods 22 1987 France, UK

5.6 Hurricane Frances 38 2004 USA, Bahamas

5.0 Winterstorm Vivian 64 1990 Western/Central Europe
5.0 Typhoon Bart 26 1999 Japan

4.5 Hurricane Georges 600 1998 USA, Caribbean
4.2 Tropical Storm Alison 41 2001 USA
4.2 Hurricane Jeanne 3,034 2004 USA, Caribbean
•In billions of dollars. Indexed to 2007.

Sources: Wharton Risk Center with data from Swiss Re and Insurance Information Institute.
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phe-related economic losses, $16 billion was covered by insurance ($11
billion for natural disasters; $5 billion for man-made). Over the past 20

years, only two had insured losses lower than in 2006 (1988 and 1997)

(Swiss Re, 2007). According to Munich Re, 950 natural catastrophes
occurred in 2007, the most since 1974. They inflicted nearly $27 billion
in insured losses.

Increased Development in Hazard-Prone Areas2

During the period between 1970 and 2004, storms and floods have
been responsible for over 90 percent of the total economic costs of
extreme weather-related events worldwide. Storms (hurricanes in
North America, typhoons in Asia, and windstorms in Europe) contrib-

ute to over 75 percent of insured losses. In constant prices (2004),
insured losses from weather-related events averaged $3 billion annually

between 1970 and 1990 and then increased significantly to $16 billion
annually between 1990 and 2004 (Association of British Insurers, 2005).
In 2005, 99.7 percent of all catastrophic losses worldwide were due to
weather-related events (Mills and Lecomte, 2006).
There are at least two principal socioeconomic factors that directly

influence the level of economic losses due to catastrophe events: degree

of urbanization and value at risk. In 1950, approximately 30 percent of
the world's population lived in cities. In 2000, about 50 percent of the
world's population (6 billion) resided in urban areas. Projections by the
United Nations show that by 2025, that figure will have increased to 60

percent based on a world population estimate of 8.3 billion people.

In hazard-prone areas, this urbanization and increase of popu-

lation also translates into increased concentration of exposure. The
development of Florida as a home for retirees is an example. According
to the US Bureau of the Census, the population of Florida has increased
significantly over the past 50 years: 2.8 million inhabitants in 1950, 6.8

million in 1970, 13 million in 1990, and a projected 19.3 million population in 2010 (almost a 700 percent increase since 1950), increasing the
likelihood of severe economic and insured losses unless cost-effective

mitigation measures are implemented.

Reducing Losses from Catastrophic Risks 909
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Figure 3. Insured Coastal Exposure as a Percentage of
Statewide Insured Exposure (Residential and Commercial
Properties) (December 2004).
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Source: Data from AIR Worldwide.

Florida also has a high density of insurance coverage, with
most houses covered against windstorm losses and about onethird insured against floods under the US National Flood Insurance

Program (NFIP),3 according to a study undertaken by Munich Re
(2000). The modeling firm AIR Worldwide estimates that nearly
80 percent of insured assets in Florida today are located near the
coasts, the high-risk area in the state (see figure 3). This represents

$1.9 trillion of insured exposure located in coastal areas (see figure

4). Insurance density is thus another critical socioeconomic factor

to consider when evaluating the evolution of insured loss due to
weather-related catastrophes.4
These factors will continue to have a major impact on the level
of insured losses from natural catastrophes. Given the growing concentration of exposure on the Gulf coast, if another hurricane like Katrina

910 social research
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Figure 4. Total Value of Insured Coastal Exposure as of December
2004, Residential and Commercial Properties
(in billions of dollars)
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were to hit the Gulf coast, it would likely inflict significant direct losses

(property damage) and indirect losses (business interruption) unless
strong mitigation measures are put in place beforehand.
CHALLENGES IN USING MITIGATION TO REDUCE FUTURE
LOSSES

We undertook an analysis of four states (Florida, New York, South
Carolina, and Texas) to determine the impact of mitigation on reducing
losses from hurricanes of different intensities to residential homes. Data

on each state's residential-only exposure to hurricane risk was provided

by Risk Management Solutions (RMS). Losses are comprised of damage
caused by the wind to buildings, contents, as well as victims' additional

living expenses (ALE). Our analyses in New York, South Carolina, and
Texas were performed looking at both the wind and storm surge peril

Reducing Losses from Catastrophic Risks 911
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using the RMS hurricane industry exposure database. The RMS analyses

in Florida did not include storm surge damage from hurricanes due to
wind, so the Florida figures underestimate the damages relative to the
other three states.

RMS also provided data on the losses assuming full mitigation
of the structures without determining whether each of the measures
was cost effective. In New York, South Carolina, and Texas, we assumed

that all houses and buildings were built to the latest standard. In
Florida, we assumed that the relevant homes met the building codes
for the Fortified ... for Safer Living program.5 These building codes are
directed only at wood-frame or masonry dwellings, which comprise 80

percent of the residential structures in the state, and include mitigation measures such as roof anchors.
Table 2 details the differences in losses for hurricanes with return

periods of 100, 250, and 500 years for each of the four states we are
studying if these loss-reduction measures were in place. The analyses
reveal that mitigation has the potential for very significant cost savings

in all four states, ranging from 61 percent in Florida for a 100-year
hurricane to 31 percent in New York for a 500-year event.
The Natural Disaster Syndrome

Recent extreme events have highlighted the challenges associated with
reducing losses from hurricanes and other natural hazards due to what

I have termed the natural disaster syndrome (Kunreuther, 1996). Many
homeowners, private businesses, and the public sector do not voluntarily adopt cost-effective loss-reduction measures. Hence, the area is
highly vulnerable and unprepared should a severe hurricane or other
natural disaster occur. The magnitude of the destruction following a
catastrophe often leads government agencies to provide disaster relief
to victims even if prior to the event the government claimed that it
had no intention of doing so. This combination of underinvestment in
protection prior to the catastrophic event, together with the general
taxpayer financing some of the recovery, can be critiqued on both efficiency and equity grounds.

912 social research
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Table 2. Money Saved from Full Mitigation for Different Return
Periods
100-Year Event

Savings Savings
from

from

State Unmitigated Losses Mitigation Mitigation (%)
FL

$84

bn

NY

$6

SC

$4bn

TX

$51

bn

$17

$2

bn

61%

bn

39%

$2bn

44%

bn

Savings Savings
from

from

State Unmitigated Losses Mitigation Mitigation (%)
FL

$126

bn

NY

$13

bn

SC

$7bn

TX

$27

$5bn

$3bn

bn

$9

37%
41%

bn

32%

500-Year Event

Savings from Savings from

State Unmitigated Losses Mitigation ($) Mitigation (%)
FL

$160

bn

NY

$19

SC

$9bn

TX

$37

$83

bn

bn

bn

$7bn

$4bn
$12

bn

52%
35%

39%
31%

One of the reasons for the natural disaster syndrome is due to the

decision-making processes of individuals with respect to events such
as a Category 3 or 4 hurricane or a major earthquake. Prior to a disaster, many individuals perceive its likelihood as sufficiently low that
they argue, "It will not happen to me." As a result, they do not feel the

need to invest voluntarily in protective measures, such as strengthen-
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ing their house or buying insurance. It is only after the disaster occurs
that these same individuals express remorse that they didn't undertake

protective measures.

Another reason that individuals do not invest in protective
measures is that they are extremely myopic and tend to focus on the
returns only over the next couple of years. In addition, there is exten-

sive experimental evidence showing that human temporal discounting

tends to be hyperbolic, where temporally distant events are dispro-

portionately discounted relative to immediate ones. As an example,
people are willing to pay more to have the timing of the receipt of a
cash prize accelerated from tomorrow to today, than from two days
from now to tomorrow (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991). The implication
of hyperbolic discounting for mitigation decisions is that we are asking

residents to invest a tangible fixed sum now to achieve a benefit later
that we instinctively undervalue - and one that we, paradoxically, hope
never to see at all. The effect of placing too much weight on immediate
considerations is that the upfront costs of mitigation will loom dispro-

portionately large relative to the delayed expected benefits in losses
over time.

There is extensive evidence that residents in hazard-prone areas
do not undertake loss-prevention measures voluntarily. A 1974 survey
of more than 1,000 California homeowners in earthquake-prone areas

revealed that only 12 percent of the respondents had adopted any
protective measures (Kunreuther et al., 1978). Fifteen years later, there

was little change despite the increased public awareness of the earthquake hazard. In a 1989 survey of 3,500 homeowners in four California
counties at risk from earthquakes, only 5 to 9 percent of the respon-

dents in these areas reported adopting any loss reduction measures.
Palm et al. (1990), Burby et al. (1988), and Laska (1991) have found a
similar reluctance by residents in flood-prone areas to invest in mitigation measures.

In the case of flood damage, Burby (2006) provides compelling
evidence that actions taken by the federal government, such as building

914 social research
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levees, make residents feel safe when, in fact, they are still targets for

catastrophes should the levee be breached or overtopped. This problem
is reinforced by local public officials who do not enforce building codes

or impose land-use regulations to restrict development in high hazard

areas. If developers do not design homes to be resistant to disasters
and individuals do not voluntarily adopt mitigation measures, one can
expect large-scale losses following a catastrophic event, as evidenced by
the property damage to New Orleans caused by Hurricane Katrina.

Even after the devastating 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, a
large number of residents had still not invested in relatively inexpensive loss-reduction measures with respect to their property, nor had
they undertaken emergency preparedness measures.
A survey of 1,100 adults living along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts
undertaken in May 2006 revealed that 83 percent of the responders had
not taken steps to fortify their home, 68 percent did not have a hurri-

cane survival kit, and 60 percent did not have a family disaster plan
(Goodnough, 2006).
THE ROLE OF INSURANCE IN ENCOURAGING MITIGATION

Given the significant increase in damage from hurricanes and other
natural disasters during the past 15 years because of the growing popu-

lation and assets in high-risk areas, we need a new approach so property owners undertake effective mitigation measures. In addition to
well-enforced building codes there is a role that insurance can play to

encourage the adoption of these measures and overcome the "it will

not happen to me" and hyberbolic discount rate biases discussed in
the previous section. Two principles should guide the development of
insurance programs for reducing future losses and allocating the costs
of disasters in an efficient and equitable manner.
Principle 1 - Premiums Reflecting Risk: Insurance premiums should

be based on risk to provide signals to individuals as to the hazards
they face and to encourage them to engage in cost-effective mitigation

measures to reduce their vulnerability to catastrophes.

Reducing Losses from Catastrophic Risks 915
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Principle 2 - Dealing with Equity and Affordability Issues: Any special

treatment given to residents in hazard-prone areas (for example, low-

income homeowners) should come from general public funding and
not through insurance premium subsidies.

Principle 1 is important because its application would provide
a clear signal of relative damage to those currently residing in areas

subject to natural disasters and those who are considering moving
into these regions. Risk-based premiums also enable insurers to
provide discounts to homeowners and businesses who invest in costeffective loss-reduction mitigation measures. If insurers are required
to charge artificially low premiums, they have no economic incentive
to offer these discounts. In fact, they prefer not to offer coverage to
these property owners because it is a losing proposition in the longrun.

Principle 2 reflects a concern for some residents in hazard-prone

areas who will be faced with large premium increases if insurers are

permitted to adhere to Principle 1. Today, regulations imposed by
state insurance commissioners keep premiums artificially lower than
the risk-based level in many regions subject to hurricane damage. If
insurers charge risk-based premiums, homeowners residing in hurricane-prone areas would pay considerably more for coverage than they
currently do.
Risk-Based Rates

The first step in developing an insurance program that would adhere to
Principle 1 is to estimate the risk-based rates that would apply to differ-

ent regions of the country. Catastrophe models have been developed

that evaluate the expected losses from hurricanes, earthquakes, and
floods, using data from experts to estimate the likelihood of damages

resulting from disasters of different magnitudes and intensities.
Although there is uncertainty surrounding the estimates from these
catastrophe models, they have been widely used by insurers and reinsurers to price the risk.

916 social research
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To enable insurers to charge risk-based premiums, regulators should stay out of the rate-setting business. If one allows a truly

competitive market to operate, then insurers would not engage in
price-gouging since they would be undercut by another company that
profitably markets policies at a lower price. Regulators would still have
an important role to play in other aspects of the insurance operation by

making certain that insurers have sufficient surplus to protect unsuspecting consumers against the possibility of their becoming insolvent
following the next severe disaster.
Affordability of Coverage

The second step in the process relates to the affordability and equity

issues indicated in Principle 2. To begin with, it would be critical to

measure where and for whom affordability is truly a challenge and
whether other individuals residing in these areas (for example, those
providing valuable goods and services to other parts of the country)
deserve a subsidy.

To assist these individuals, we recommend that some type of
insurance voucher be provided by the state or federal government. This

type of in-kind assistance (rather than an unrestricted grant) assures
that the recipients use the funds for obtaining insurance. If this system

were applied to a family in a hazard-prone area, it would pay an insurance premium that reflects risk, and then be reimbursed by the state
for a portion of the increased cost of insurance over the prior year's

policy. The amount of reimbursement could be determined by their
income and the risk-based insurance premium that they are charged.
Several existing programs could serve as models for developing
such a voucher system.
Food Stamp Program. Under the food stamp program, a family is

given vouchers to purchase food based on its annual income and size
of the family. The idea for the program was born in the late 1930s,
revived as a pilot program in 1961, and extended nationwide in 1974.
The current program structure was implemented in 1977 with a goal of

Reducing Losses from Catastrophic Risks 917
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alleviating hunger and malnutrition by permitting low-income households to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal purchasing of
food from grocery stores. Food stamps are available to most low-income
households with limited resources regardless of age, disability status, or
family structure.6 The program is funded entirely by the federal govern-

ment. Federal and state governments share administrative costs (with
the federal government contributing nearly 50 percent). In 2003, total
federal food stamp costs were nearly $24 billion. As of June 2007, more

than 26 million individuals benefit from this program (Food Research
and Action Center, 2007).
low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). The mission of

this program is to assist low-income households that pay a high proportion of their income for home energy in meeting their immediate energy

needs. The funding is provided by the federal government but is admin-

istered by the states and federally recognized tribes or insular areas
(Guam, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, for example) to help eligible lowincome homeowners and renters meet their heating or cooling needs
(eligibility based on similar criteria than the food stamp program).7 The

federal government became involved in awarding energy assistance
funds to low-income households program as a result of the increase
in oil prices resulting from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC) oil embargo in 1973. Over the past few years, the
annual appropriation of this program has averaged $2 billion.8
Universal Service Fund (USF).9 The USF was created by the Federal

Communications Commission in 1997 to ensure that consumers in all
regions of the country have access to telecommunications services that

are reasonably priced relative to those in urban areas. To achieve this

goal, the USF provides discounts to low-income individuals in highcost rural areas, and to other special groups, such as rural health care
providers, schools, and libraries in those areas. All telecommunication

carriers that provide service internationally and between states pay
contributions into the USF. The carriers may build this factor into their
billing systems if they choose to recoup this amount from their custom-

918 social research
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ers. The USF provides discounts that make basic, local telephone service
affordable to more than 7 million low-income consumers. From 1998 to

2006, over $50 billion has been disbursed by this fund.
Who Should Subsidize Insurance?

The above programs use different methods to subsidize low-income
families for specific goods and services. With respect to homeowners insurance, there are several different ways that vouchers could be
provided that mirror these programs.
General Taxpayer. If one takes the position that everyone in soci-

ety is responsible for assisting those who reside in hazard-prone areas,

then one could utilize general taxpayer revenue from the federal
government to cover the costs of insurance vouchers. This is what is
currently done by the food stamp program and the low-income home
energy assistance program.
State Government. An alternative (or complementary) source of
funding would come from taxes on residents and/or commercial enterprises in the state exposed to natural disaster. One argument that could

be made for this type of funding arrangement is that states obtain
significant financial benefits from economic development in their juris-

dictions through the collection of property taxes or other state revenue

such as gasoline taxes, state income taxes, and sales taxes. If residents

in coastal areas receive greater benefits from the economic development in these regions than others in the state, they should be taxed
proportionately more than those residing inland.
Insurance Policyholders. A special tax could be levied on all insur-

ance policyholders for covering the costs of these vouchers. The rationale for this type of tax would be that all homeowners (as opposed to
all taxpayers) should be responsible for helping to protect those who
cannot afford protection or should be subsidized for other reasons. The

justification for such a program would be similar to the rationale for
establishing the USF for telecommunication service: providing affordable telephone service to all residents in the country.

Reducing Losses from Catastrophic Risks 919
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LONG-TERM HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE10
Need for Long-Term Insurance

Based on the principle of risk-based rates, insurers should consider
marketing long-term insurance contracts on residential property as a
way of providing stability to homeowners and encouraging adoption
of cost-effective mitigation measures. There is precedent for long-term

contracts in insurance - Benjamin Franklin created the Philadelphia
Contributionship for the Insuring of Houses from Fire in 1752. It eventually became the Green Tree Mutual Assurance Company, which closed
its doors in 2004.11

Short-term insurance policies create significant social costs.

Evidence from recent disasters reveals that many consumers fail
to adequately protect their homes or even insure at all, creating a
welfare cost to themselves and a possible cost to all taxpayers in the
form of government disaster assistance. To illustrate, the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reported that 41 percent of
damaged homes from the 2005 hurricanes were uninsured or underinsured. Of the 60,196 owner-occupied homes with severe wind damage

from these hurricanes, 23,000 (38 percent) did not have insurance
against wind loss (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007).

The absence of long-term insurance (LTI) also results in direct
private costs to both the insurer and the insured. The private value
of the LTI over a period of N years is higher than the sum of N oneyear insurance contracts if the risk remains constant over time for two

reasons: 1) LTI reduces the transaction costs to consumers should their

annual homeowners policy not be renewed and to insurers should
homeowners cancel their policy, and 2) an LTI reduces the uncertainty

to homeowners as to whether their premiums will be significantly
increased following a severe disaster.
For a long-term insurance policy to be feasible (say, 10 or 25 years),

insurers would have to be able to charge a rate that reflects their best
estimate of the risk over that time period (Principle 1). The uncertainty

surrounding these estimates could be reflected in the premium as a

920 social research
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function of the length of the insurance contract, in much the same way

that the interest rate on fixed-rate mortgages varies between 15-, 25-,
and 30-year loans. Insurance vouchers could be provided to homeowners who cannot afford coverage at risk-based rates (Principle 2).

The obvious advantage of a long-term insurance contract from
the point of view of policyholders is that it provides them with stability and an assurance that their property is protected for as long as they

own it. This has been a major concern in hazard-prone areas where
insurers have cancelled policies following severe disasters such as those
that occurred during the 2005 hurricane season.
Encouraging Adoption of Mitigation Measures

Long-term insurance also provides economic incentives for investing
in mitigation where current annual insurance policies (even if they are

risk-based) are unlikely to do the trick due to the behavioral consid-

erations discussed in the previous section. To highlight this point,
consider the following simple example. Suppose a family could invest
$1,500 to strengthen the roof of its house so as to reduce the damage
by $30,000 from a future hurricane with an annual probability of 1/100.

An insurer charging a risk-based premium would be willing to reduce
the annual charge by $300 (that is, 1/100 x $30,000) to reflect the lower

expected losses that would occur if a hurricane hit the area in which
the policyholder was residing. If the house was expected to last for 10 or
more years, the net present value of the expected benefit of investing in

this measure would exceed the upfront cost at an annual discount rate
as high as 15 percent.

Under current annual insurance contracts, many property
owners would be reluctant to incur the $1,500 because they would get
only $300 back next year. If they underweight the future, the expected
discounted benefits would likely be less than their $1,500 upfront costs.

In addition, budget constraints could discourage them from investing
in the mitigation measure. Other considerations would also play a role
in a family's decision not to invest in these measures: the family may be
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uncertain as to how long they will reside in the area or whether their
insurer would reward them again when their policy is renewed.
A 20-year required insurance policy ties the contract to the property rather than to the individual. In fact, the homeowner could obtain

a $1,500 home improvement loan tied to the mortgage at an annual
interest rate of 10 percent, resulting in payments of $145 per year. If
the insurance premium was reduced by $300, the savings to the homeowner each year would be $155. Alternatively, this loan could be incorporated as part of the mortgage at a lower interest rate.

A bank would have a financial incentive to provide this type of
loan. By linking the mitigation expenditures to the structure rather than

to the current property owner, the annual payments would be lower

and this would be a selling point to mortgagees. The bank would be
more fully protected against a catastrophic loss to the property, and the

insurer's potential loss from a major disaster would be reduced. These
mitigation loans would constitute a new financial product. Moreover,
the general public will now be less likely to have large amounts of their

tax dollars going for disaster relief. A win-win-win situation for all!
(Kunreuther, 2006)

There is an additional benefit to insurers in having banks

encourage individuals to invest in cost-effective mitigation
measures. The costs of reinsurance, which protects insurers against

catastrophic losses, should now decrease. If reinsurers know that
they are less likely to make large payments to insurers because each

piece of property in a region now has a lower chance of experiencing a large loss, then they will reduce their premiums to the insurer
for the same reason that the insurer is reducing its premium to the
property owner.

Suppose that an insurer had 1,000 identical insurance policies
in the area in which the above family lived, and each one would have
a claims payment of $40,000 following a hurricane if homes had not
strengthened their roofs. The insurer's loss from such a disaster would

be $40 million. Suppose that the insurer wants to have $25 million in
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coverage from a reinsurer to protect its surplus. If the hypothetical
hurricane has a 1 in 100 chance of hitting the region where these fami-

lies reside, the expected loss to a reinsurer would be $250,000 and the
premium charged to the insurer would reflect this. If the bank required
that all 1,000 homes have their roofs fortified to meet the local building
code and each homeowner's loss were reduced to $10,000, then insurer's total loss would be $10 million should all 1,000 homes be affected,

and it would not require reinsurance. This savings would be passed on
by the insurer in the form of a lower premium.
Open Questions for Designing Long-Term Insurance Contracts

A number of issues and questions associated with the development of a
long-term insurance policy have a direct impact on insurers and homeowners, and indirect effects on other stakeholders, that require further

research and analysis. Some of the issues that need to be resolved
include:

Nature of the Contract: Long-term insurance could be offered by
insurers in the form of a fixed-price contract (FPC) for the full term of

the policy (for example, 20 years) or an adjustable premium contract
(APC) at a variable premium with guaranteed renewal for the term of
the policy. The annual premium would be reset based on an index that
would have to be simple and transparent. Policyholders will want the
option to terminate the contract; mortgage markets provide examples

of both good and bad practices. On FPCs, formal arrangements may

be necessary to make the insurer whole through provisions such as
yield maintenance and defeasance (the two most common methods for

dealing with prepayment costs on commercial mortgages). On APCs,
the borrower would want the right to terminate the contract within

a certain time period of a premium increase notification, such as 3
months.

Protection Against Catastrophic Losses: One would also need to know

how the rating agencies will view long-term FPC commitments, since
the insurer is now locked into the premium even if the expected losses
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rise. To protect itself against possible increases in the probability of
catastrophic losses over time, insurers marketing FPCs would have to
be able to invest in cat bonds or other forms of securitized risks. Some

type of government guarantee might be necessary to deal with both
insurers' and policyholders' concerns with respect to the ability to pay
claims in the future following a catastrophic loss. As for the pricing of
the product, FPC premiums would likely be somewhat higher than APC
premiums to protect insurers against an increase in the risk during the
contract period. This behavior would be similar to the pricing of fixedrate mortgages relative to adjustable rate mortgages.
One of the central issues will be how high the price of a long-term

contract will be, given the ambiguities associated with the risk and the

capital costs for covering catastrophic losses. Without some type of
protection against large losses either through long-term risk transfer
instruments (which currently do not exist) or a government reinsurance program at the state or federal level, the premiums for FPCs are
likely to be extremely high so that there would be little demand for this

type of coverage.
Understanding the Contract: Those who purchase insurance policies
often have a difficult time understanding every aspect of the terms of the

contract - what risks are covered, what risks are not, and the basis for

being charged a specific rate. The problem is likely to be compounded
for a long-term insurance contract. There is an opportunity for insurers to educate consumers as to the basis for the premiums they charge
by providing more detail on the types of risks that are covered and the

amount charged for different levels of protection. More specifically,
insurers could break down the premium into coverage against fire, theft,

wind damage, and other losses included in a homeowners policy, and
how the premium varied with the length of the long-term contract.
It would be beneficial for insurers to reveal this information so

that homeowners will be able to make better decisions by understanding the nature of the contract and what alternative options cost them.

They will then be able to make trade-offs between costs and expected
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benefits, which is impossible for them to do today. Thaler and Sunstein

(2008) argue for this type of information disclosure by proposing a
form of government regulation termed RECAP (Record, Evaluate, and

Compare Alternative Prices). They recommend that the government

not regulate prices but require disclosure practices - not in a long,
unintelligible document, but in a spreadsheet-like format that includes
all relevant formulas.

Requiñnglnsurance Coverage: One needs to consider whether insur-

ance should be required on all residential property. This would not be
a radical change from the current situation - homeowners who have
a mortgage are normally required by the bank that finances the loan
to purchase coverage against wind damage for the length of the mort-

gage. Similarly, those in flood-prone areas are required to purchase
flood insurance under the National Flood Insurance Program if they

have a federally insured mortgage. Insurance coverage is required
today for other consumer purchases. Today in all states motorists
must show proof of financial responsibility on their automobile insurance policy for bodily injury and property damage liability in order to
register their car.

If all homes were required to purchase a homeowners policy it
would enable insurers to more easily diversify their risks and hence
reduce the likelihood of suffering catastrophic losses over the length of

the long-term contract. Another advantage of requiring homeowners
insurance is that it will reduce the likelihood of liberal disaster assis-

tance following the next large-scale disaster since victims will have
financial protection.

Whether long-term insurance will be attractive to insurers,
homeowners, regulators, and other relevant stakeholders will certainly
depend on the market conditions that come with it. What is clear today,

however, is that we need innovative programs for reducing future
losses from disasters that involve combined strengths of the public and
private sectors. For insurance to play an important role in this regard,

one needs to understand what a policy can and cannot do as a function
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of the nature of the risk, the type of coverage provided by the insurer
and the premium structure.
THE BENEFITS OF MITIGATION

We can summarize the conclusions that emerge from this paper with
the following points:
► The losses from natural disasters have increased significantly in
the past 15 years, and we as a society are more vulnerable to catastrophic losses in future years than we have been in the past.
► A principal reason for these increased losses is the continuing

economic development in hazard-prone areas. The development
of Florida highlights this point: the projected population in Florida

in 2010 will be 19.3 million - a 700 percent increase over the 2.8
million inhabitants residing in the state in 1950.
► By mitigating existing and new homes with structural measures
(for example, better designed roofs) one could reduce future disaster losses significantly. If all residential homes in Florida were fully

mitigated, the damage from a 100-year hurricane would be reduced
from $84 billion to $33 billion, a decrease of 61 percent.
► Individuals are reluctant to invest in cost-effective mitigation for

many reasons, including an underestimation of the risk, a focus on
short-term returns, and budget constraints.

► Insurance provides an opportunity to reward individuals who
undertake mitigation measures by offering discounts on insurance
premiums. For insurers to want to provide these premium reductions they need to be able to charge risk-based rates. If one wants

to subsidize some homeowners in hazard-prone areas (low-income
residents), vouchers should come from sources outside of insurance
using models such as the food stamp program.
► Long-term insurance tied to the property rather than to the

individual provides financial stability to individuals residing in
hazard-prone areas and should lead to the adoption of cost-effective
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mitigation measures that would normally not be adopted under
annual insurance policies. Such a program raises a number of questions for future research.

NOTES

* This paper incorporates material from a study on Managing LargeScale Risks in a New Era of Catastrophes (Wharton Risk Management

and Decision Processes Center in conjunction with Georgia State
University and the Insurance Information Institute, March 2008)

and Kunreuther (2008). It reflects many helpful discussions with
my colleagues on the project: Neil Doherty, Martin Grace, Robert
Klein, Paul Kleindorfer, Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Mark Pauly, and Paul

Raschky. Funding for the Wharton Risk Management and Decision
Processes Center's "Managing and Financing Extreme Events" project is gratefully acknowledged.

1. This table excludes payments for flood by the National Flood
Insurance Program in the United States (for example, $17.3 billion in
2005 as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita).

2. This subsection is based on Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2007).
3. Ine NMP is a public insurance program created in 1968. Under the
program, insurers play the role of intermediaries between the policyholders and the federal government. Following Hurricane Katrina,
the program had to borrow $20 billion from the federal government

in 2006 to meet its claims. Congress is considering modifying the
program substantially.

4. For additional data on the economic impact of future catastrophic
hurricanes see the Financial Services Roundtable (2007).

5. Information on this program is available on the website of the
Institute for Business and Home Safety at <http://www.ibhs.org/prop-

erty_protection/default.asp?id=8>.

6. More details on this program are available at <http://www.frac.org/
html/federal_food_programs/programs/fsp.html>.

7. For instance, at the end of August 2007, Secretary of Health and
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Human Services (HHS) Mike Leavitt announced that $50 million in
emergency energy assistance would be given to 12 states that experi-

enced much hotter than normal conditions during the summer.

8. For more details on this program, see US Department of Health and
Human Services at <http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/liheap/>.

9. For more details on this program, see <http://www.usac.org/about/
universal-service>.

10. The material in this section is based on Jaffee, Kunreuther, and
Michel-Kerjan (2008).

11. The Philadelphia Contributionship and other perpetual insurance companies require a large fixed payment at the time that one
purchases insurance. The interest earned on this "insurance investment" covers the annual premiums on the property. We thank Felix
Kloman for calling attention to this type of long-term insurance rela-

tionship. Kloman has favored long-term commitments and partnerships between the insurer and insured for many years, having written

columns on the topic in his publication, Risk Management Reports, in

September 1994 and October 1995.
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